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Abstract 
The 2016 presidential nominating process presented the American public with an interesting and 
tumultuous set of contests.  Despite the unique nature of both the Democratic and Republican contests, 
the candidates stuck to the usual campaign activities to help influence voters.  However, one of these 
campaign tactics, campaign visits, has been vastly understudied.  Using a uniquely compiled dataset and 
a hierarchical linear model I am able to test how campaign effects, including visits, as well as an 
individual’s predispositions impacted vote choice in the 2016 presidential nominating contests.   The 
results demonstrate that the 2016 presidential nominating contests were decided based on a 
combination of both campaign activities and individual-level predictors.    
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Throughout the 2016 presidential nominating season, political pundits and newscasters 
constantly argued about what was driving vote choice (Dutton, DePinto, and Backus 2016; Lee 2016; 
Schreckinger 2015; Zitner, Chinni, and McGill 2016).  Was it an individual’s ideology?  The idea of a 
border wall being built along the United States-Mexico border? A voter’s allegiance to a political party?  
Or, did a voter’s decision have less to do with their own predispositions and characteristics and more 
with the various campaign activities conducted by the candidates?  For example, did the well-attended 
and record-setting rallies held by Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders (see Freeman 2016 and Schleifer 
and Gray 2015) convince voters to cast their ballots in a particular way?   
 Political scientists are also divided on whether it is individual-level predictors that drive vote 
choice or if vote choice is influenced by various campaign activities.  While there are several who believe 
in the minimal effects theory (Campbell et al. 1960; Hillygus and Jackman 2003; Lazarsfeld et al. 1944), 
still others tell us that campaign activities should increase the number of votes a candidate receives 
(Herr 2002; Holbrook 1996; McClurg and Holbrook 2009; Shaw and Roberts 2000; Shepard 1977; 
Thomas 1989).  More importantly, there is a copious amount of evidence that campaigns have an even 
greater impact on an individual’s vote choice at the nomination stage than at the general election stage 
(e.g. Adams 1987;  Arterton 1978; Crouse 1972; Haynes and Flowers 2002; Lichter; Amundson, and 
Noyes 1988; Mayer 1987; Norrander 2006; Wendland 2017).  This disagreement raises an important 
question: which of these schools of thought better explains the 2016 nomination results? There seems 
to be compelling arguments for both individual predispositions and campaign activities being a driving 
force behind vote choice in this most recent set of nominating contests.   
 I answer this question by using a hierarchical linear model [HLM] to incorporate both individual- 
and state-level predictors of vote choice.  In the models I have developed I include measures of 
momentum, advertisements, endorsements, and visits to account for a candidate’s campaign activities.  
As the existing literature (further reviewed below) demonstrates, these variables have much 
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explanatory power when it comes to a voter’s decision-making process.  The campaign visits variable is 
one of particular interest here, as campaign visits have been a rather understudied predictor of vote 
choice.  Few studies have been conducted strictly examining the effects of visits on vote choice in either 
the nominating or general election stage of an election—and some of these studies use visits as a 
control rather than a variable of interest (e.g. Aldrich 1980; Haynes and Murray 1998).  As I will further 
argue, I believe visits may be an important explanatory variable that often gets overlooked.  All of the 
raw data on the state-level variables can be found in the Appendix.  In addition to these contextual 
variables, I include several individual-level variables as well.  These include ideology, party identification, 
age, race, sex, and several issue positions.  By combining both state-level and individual-level variables, 
we will be able to get a comprehensive view of how a voter makes a decision in the voting booth.   
 I begin this analysis by reviewing the relevant literature and laying out the hypotheses I will be 
testing throughout the remainder of this paper.  Then, I describe the data used to develop my 
measurements as well as the model developed to test the hypotheses.  My data include a full list of all 
of the visits conducted and ads developed by all candidates throughout the 2016 nominating season as 
well as all of the endorsements from Governors, Senators, and Congress members.  For the individual-
level variables, I use the 2016 ANES Time Series Study.  Finally, I conclude by discussing how the results 
highlight the fact that the 2016 presidential nominating contests were decided by a mix of both 
campaign- and individual-level factors.     
How Do Voters Make Decisions in Presidential Nominating Contests? 
 Looking at existing research we know a great deal about what factors affect a voter’s decision in 
the voting booth in presidential nominations.  We see many arguments in favor of analyzing the 
momentum a candidate has generated coming out of early wins in Iowa and New Hampshire (Aldrich 
1980; Bartels 1988; Kenney and Rice 1994).  Others argue that momentum is not a full explanation for 
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what is ultimately driving the decisions made by voters and we should instead look at what factors make 
candidates drop out of the race rather than surge ahead (Damore, Hansford, and Barghothi 2010; 
Norrander 2000; Norrander 2006).  Looking at the nomination process as a game of attrition rather than 
momentum seems to help solidify the importance of campaign advertising, visits, and other candidate 
activities that may influence a voter’s decision.  Other scholars argue that party and elite endorsements 
along with the cues they send voters are what really matter when it comes to picking a party’s nominee 
(Anderson 2013; Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller 2008; Dowdle, Adkins, and Steger 2009; Kousser, Lucas, 
Masket, and McGhee 2015; Rapoport, Stone, and Abramowitz 1991; Steger 2007).  Finally, still other 
scholars point to individual-level predictors (e.g. issue positions, ideology, partisanship) as the driving 
force behind an individual’s vote choice.   
While we have several explanations for how voters make decisions in nominating contests and 
understand the important predictors that aid in explaining vote choice (e.g. momentum, visits ads, 
endorsements, ideology, issues), there has yet to be a comprehensive look at the 2016 nomination 
process.  Further, as Aldrich (1980) tells us, because of the differing dynamics between the nominating 
process and general elections, there is compelling evidence that the behavior of individual voters varies 
between these two distinct phases of a presidential election.  Because the decision costs of participating 
in nominating contests are generally higher than for general elections—largely due to their intra-party 
nature—these predictors of vote choice should arguably play a larger role in explaining a voter’s 
decision.  Were campaign dynamics the driving force behind a voter’s choice?  Was it elite 
endorsements?  Or, were the predispositions and characteristics voters brought with them into the 
voting booth the driving force behind their decision?  To answer these questions, it is important to 
understand the various reasons why these campaign aspects may have an impact on voters’ decisions—
the relevant literature that helps with this understanding is reviewed below.   
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Since Jimmy Carter’s surprising win in Iowa garnered him more media attention than anticipated 
and catapulted him to the Democratic nomination in 1976, momentum has been viewed as an 
important predictor of a candidate’s performance in a nomination campaign (Aldrich 1980; Bartels 
1988). Aldrich (1980) points out that momentum has a two-fold effect: it raises a candidate’s 
competitive standing and increases their ability to fundraise successfully.  By winning early contests, a 
candidate is viewed as more viable than a candidate who has not won previously.  This makes voters 
more willing to vote for that candidate in future contests as well as donate money, helping the 
candidate prolong her campaign.  Kenney and Rice (1985) find support for the idea that momentum 
causes a bandwagon effect among voters in their analysis of the 1988 Republican nomination of George 
Bush, demonstrating that some voters were willing to support Bush because they thought he had the 
nomination locked up despite the fact that they supported a different candidate.  Thus, I expect that 
momentum will once again help voters decide.  Specifically, in 2016, I expect momentum will help Trump 
because of his early and more consistent wins, whereas on the Democratic side I expect that momentum 
will not matter because Clinton and Sanders traded wins, with neither one being able to build 
momentum.   
Closely tied with the theory of momentum is the idea that endorsements play an important part 
in helping a candidate succeed (Anderson 2013; Cohen et al 2008).  Cohen et al (2008) argue that while 
many believe that the McGovern Fraser Commission stripped parties of their power in the nomination 
season, this power was simply relocated.  Party elites no longer make decisions in a smoke-filled back 
room, but instead make public endorsements of their preferred candidate.  These authors thoroughly 
demonstrate that voters rely on these endorsements and do not seem to possess strong feelings about 
the candidates on their own.   
Steger (2007) argues that endorsements help Republicans more than Democrats, as Republican 
elites are willing to make endorsements earlier in the invisible primary season and tend to rally around 
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one or two candidates, thus signaling to voters which candidate(s) is (are) best.  Democratic elites, 
however, tend to send weaker messages through endorsements, as they tend to wait until after the 
Iowa Caucuses or New Hampshire primary to make an endorsement.  Dowdle, Adkins, and Steger (2009) 
support Steger’s (2007) findings that early coalescing of party elites behind a candidate gains that 
candidate more media attention, higher poll numbers, and better fundraising results.  Kousser et al. 
(2015), however, pose the question of whether party elites are actually boosting a candidate’s chances 
or jumping on a winning candidate’s bandwagon.  Despite initial skepticism, these authors discover that 
the effect of endorsements is likely smaller than many think, but ultimately both statistically and 
substantively significant.   Specifically, they find that endorsements matter for Independent voters as 
well as voters who identify as the same party as the candidate being endorsed.  Thus, I expect that, 
consistent with existing research, elite endorsements will have a positive effect on vote choice for both 
Democratic and Republican candidates.   
What both of the preceding theories miss is the importance of the campaign activities 
candidates use to gain votes throughout the nomination season.  Candidates advertise, hold rallies and 
town hall meetings, and ultimately spend millions of dollars running for their party’s nomination.  
Conventional wisdom tells us that these candidate activities are not for naught at the nomination stage 
(Barker 2005; Bartels 1985, 1993; Grush 1980; Gurian 1993a, 1993b; Norrander 1993, 1996; Parent, 
Jillson, and Weber 1987; Ridout 2004, 2008).  These authors find significant evidence that campaign 
spending and advertising impact voters when deciding which candidate to support.  The more a 
candidate spends and advertises, the better that candidate does.  Does this pattern hold for the 2016 
contests?  Taking a preliminary look at advertising in these contests (the raw data for which can be 
found in the Appendix), we see that both Clinton and Trump both ran more ads than their competitors.  
Clinton ran 216,989 ads, compared to Sanders’ 209,576.  On the Republican side, Trump ran 51,681 ads 
while Rubio and Cruz, Trump’s closest competitors, ran 39,539 and 44,445 ads, respectively (Zubak-
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Skees 2016).  Obviously this does not imply causation, but it does demonstrate anecdotal support for 
the prior finding that more advertising leads to more votes as both Clinton and Trump won their 
respective party’s nomination.  I therefore expect that advertising will help Trump and Clinton build 
support among voters because they spent more on advertising than their competitors.   
Finally, we have evidence that there are individual-level factors that are likely to impact a voter’s 
choice in addition to campaign dynamics.  An individual’s issue positions may help influence how he or 
she votes (Marshall 1983; Kenney 1993) especially when a candidate has been focusing on a particular 
issue strongly (Norrander 1996).  In 2016 there were clear issue positions taken by the candidates.  
Trump laid out a plan to build a wall at the Mexican-American border and deport undocumented 
immigrants.  Several of his opponents (most notably Jeb Bush, John Kasich, and Marco Rubio) called for 
more compassionate policies toward undocumented immigrants.  On the Democratic side, Clinton and 
Sanders took similar stances on immigration, with both candidates supporting a path to citizenship for 
those in the United States illegally and opposing the idea of a border wall.  A Pew Research Center 
report (2016) points to the fact that immigration was more important to Republican voters, but not 
overlooked by Democrats either.  The report states that 79 percent of Trump supporters viewed 
immigration as very important to their vote decision, while 65 percent of Clinton supporters viewed the 
issue as very important.  Additionally, immigration was viewed as a more important issue in 2016 than in 
the past several election cycles.  70 percent of voters viewed immigration as important in 2016, 
compared to only 41 percent in 2012 and 54 percent in 2008 (Pew 2016).   
Both Democrats and Republicans also stressed the economy on the campaign trail.  Trump 
spoke repeatedly about his business experience and how this will translate into economic success.  
Clinton and Sanders focused on minimum wage increases, making college more affordable, and stronger 
regulations on the banking industry.   This is likely due to the fact that many Americans viewed the 
economy as the most important issue facing the country right now (Casselman 2015; Gallup 2015; Pew 
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2016).  According to a Gallup poll asking voters about America’s most pressing problem, 33 percent of 
respondents said the economy, 16 percent said poorly run government, and 8 percent said immigration 
(Casselman 2015).  These were the top three problems, followed by gun control, health care, and 
education.  Further, according to a partisan breakdown by the Pew Research Center (2016) 90 percent 
of Trump supporters said the economy was very important to their vote, as did 80 percent of Clinton 
voters.  Thus, I expect that voters focused on the increasingly salient issues of immigration and economic 
conditions received clear signals from the candidates and voted in accordance with their predisposed 
issue position(s).  
 In addition to issue positions, Ideology and partisanship, while less important at the nomination 
stage, may still impact voters in nominating contests (Bartels 1988).  While these traits take on 
tremendous importance at the general election stage (see Huddy et al 2015), they are of lesser 
importance at the nomination stage because of the intra-party nature of primaries and caucuses rather 
than the inter-party nature of general elections (Aldrich 1980).  Kenney (1993), however, argues that 
these traits help voters infer a candidate’s issue positions.  With Trump portraying himself as more of a 
populist candidate than a true conservative, and Sanders self-identifying as a democratic-socialist, the 
American public was presented with candidates that diverged greatly from the norm in terms of typical 
nomination candidates.  Thus, I hypothesize that ideology and partisanship will be an asset to voters in 
2016.   
Finally, there is evidence that demographics matter in nomination contests (Bartels 1988; 
Jackman and Vavreck 2010; Norrander 1996).  Bartels (1988) tells us that demographics help determine 
and explain a voter’s political predispositions, while Norrander (1996) explains that demographics 
influence the constituency groups to which a voter belongs.  Jackman and Vavreck (2010) find that 
demographics were important in the 2008 Democratic nominating contest, with young voters two times 
as supportive of Obama over Clinton, female voters two times as supportive of Clinton, and White 
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voters more supportive of Clinton than Obama.  Demographics are likely to matter in 2016 as well.  
Clinton is likely to get more support from female and minority voters, as she stressed her work with 
minorities throughout her career, her strong support for women’s issues, as well as her ties to Obama.  
Sanders is likely to gain support from younger voters because of his focus on education reform and 
raising the minimum wage.  Trump, on the Republican side, is likely to see depressed support from 
females and minorities because of his many misogynistic and bigoted statements on the campaign trail.   
The Importance of Understudied Campaign Visits 
What all of this research reviewed above ignores is the impact of campaign visits.  Campaign 
visits are appearances made by a candidate in a state.  These visits include campaign rallies, town hall 
meetings, stump speeches, and stopping by a local restaurant or pub to talk with voters and sample the 
local cuisine—for example, ordering a Cheesesteak when visiting Philadelphia.  Campaign visits may be 
an important tool in a candidate’s strategy and all candidates conduct them, but very little work has 
been done to investigate the impact these visits have on a voter’s decision in the voting booth.  
Campaign visits present candidates with another avenue for reaching out to voters.  In fact, visits are a 
more personal way for candidates to connect with potential voters, as they are able to tailor their 
message to the crowd to which they are speaking.  Similar to the argument presented by Domke and 
Coe (2010), through a visit, a candidate is able to connect with a group of people in a state by 
demonstrating their understanding of that state’s concerns.  These authors examine the role of 
“presidential pilgrimages” to religious landmarks and demonstrate that by visiting important religious 
landmarks, leaders, and locations, presidents are able to connect with and draw support from religious 
voters.  This same logic should apply to campaign visits, generally.   
When we look at the speeches made by candidates on the campaign trail, we can see that they 
do indeed try to personalize their messages in visits.  For example, in her speech to voters in Detroit, 
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Michigan, Hillary Clinton spoke about the water crisis in Flint and the organized labor groups important 
to the manufacturing economy of Michigan (C-SPAN 2016).  By discussing manufacturing and 
referencing a specific local factory, Clinton made a personal appeal to these voters and tried to 
demonstrate that she understands what is important to Michigan voters.   
Visits do not only allow candidates to personalize their message to the voters, but they allow 
voters to get a more personal view of the candidate. They are not watching the candidate in a prepared 
media appearance or a scripted ad.  Instead, they see the candidate live and in-person, allowing them to 
get a better idea of a candidate’s character and personal qualities.  They are also able to observe how 
the candidate handles a question and answer session.  Are they able to speak off the cuff without 
committing a major gaffe?  Are they able to have a substantive policy discussion without necessarily 
being prepared ahead of time?  These are questions voters are able to get answers to that other 
campaign activities cannot showcase.   
We can expect visits to impact election results in several ways.  Visits allow candidates to make 
direct appeals to voters and ask for their support on election day, simply by asking for their vote.  These 
visits are also another source of information for voters.  Aldrich (1993) demonstrates that it is the job of 
the candidate to provide voters with information in an effort to make it as easy as possible for voters to 
choose for whom to vote.  The candidate that makes the decision easiest for the voter stands to gain 
votes (Jamieson 2001; Popkin 1994).  Campaign visits are likely going to appeal to party activists—or at 
least those that are already paying attention to the campaign.  Nonetheless, this is where we may see 
visits have a two-step effect, in that these activists will likely speak with their neighbors, friends, family, 
and coworkers about the candidate they support.  By energizing activists through a visit, candidates are 
also hoping to gain grass roots volunteers to help inspire further support and more volunteers.   
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Jones (1998) looks at the impact visits have on both turnout rates and candidate preference.  He 
finds that visits are an effective mobilization tool, especially when they are conducted closer to the 
primary or caucus date.  In terms of vote choice, he found that visits were only a significant predictor for 
Democratic candidates and had no impact among Republican voters.  He attributes this to a higher 
susceptibility of Democrats to campaign activities, as Republicans are more naturally predisposed to 
voting because of their higher income and education levels.  Based on the research available, it seems 
likely that visits should indeed have an impact on vote choice.  However, there are clearly mixed results, 
as very little consistency has been found over the few studies that have analyzed the impact of 
campaign visits.  When we look at the 2016 contests, we see Trump and Clinton were able to conduct 
more visits than their opponents.  The number of visits conducted by candidates throughout the 
nominating season can be found in the Appendix.  Specifically, Trump conducted 192 visits compared to 
the 147 conducted by Cruz and 145 by Rubio.  On the Democratic side, Clinton made 188 visits 
compared to Sanders’ 182 visits.  However, this is not a substantial difference and Sanders repeatedly 
made headlines for the size of his crowds, while Clinton’s rallies were well attended, but failed to 
achieve the record-breaking headlines like Sanders’ rallies (Landers 2016; O’Keefe and Wagner 2015).    
In addition, Trump was able to draw large crowds, but at the same time had conducted more visits than 
his opponents as well.  Therefore, I expect that campaign visits will increase support for Donald Trump 
and Bernie Sanders, as both of these candidates turned out record-breaking crowds and created 
enthusiasm among voters.   
Data and Testing Strategy 
The data to test the hypotheses above come from a variety of sources.  For the dependent 
variable, the data come from the American National Election Studies [ANES] 2016 Time Series Study.  
The respondent is asked which candidate he or she voted for in the 2016 presidential nominating 
contests.  I use this data to construct five separate models: one for each of the leading candidates.  Each 
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one, therefore, models vote choice for Clinton, Sanders, Trump, Cruz, or Rubio as a function of the 
independent variables discussed below.  I break the survey into Democrats and Republicans and for 
each model, code a respondent as one if they intend to vote for the candidate in question and zero 
otherwise.  For the 2016 Democrats, because it was mostly a two-candidate race, I simply compare the 
votes for Clinton and Sanders.  Therefore in the Clinton model, Clinton’s supporters are coded one and 
Sanders’ supporters are coded zero.  For the Republicans, because it was a multi-candidate race, the 
dependent variable is coded one if the respondent voted for the candidate of interest and zero if he or 
she voted for a different candidate.  For example, in the Trump model, the dependent variable is coded 
one if the respondent voted for Trump and zero if he or she voted for one of the other Republican 
candidates.   
The data on party endorsements comes from the compilation of endorsements from U.S. 
Representatives, U.S. Senators, and U.S. state Governors done by Aaron Bycoffe at fivethirtyeight.com.  
Modeled on Steger (2007), I create a percentage of state-level endorsements received by each 
candidate in each state.  For example, Hillary Clinton received four out of Minnesota’s seven 
endorsements, while Sanders received three.  Clinton’s endorsement percentage for Minnesota is 
therefore 57 percent while Sanders’ percentage is 43 percent.   
Momentum is measured similarly to Norrander (1993).  I score the top three primary finishers 
three, two, and one for a first, second, and third place finish, respectively starting with the Iowa 
Caucuses.  Then, to discount this effect over time, as voters forget which candidate won previous 
contests, each week’s score is multiplied by a factor of 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 for the three weeks following 
each state’s contest, respectively.   
The campaign ads data come from the Center for Public Integrity, which counted the number of 
ads run by the various presidential candidates.  Similar to my endorsement score, each candidate is 
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given a percentage score for each state, exemplifying the percentage of their party’s campaign ads run 
by that candidate.  Looking at the Republican race in Missouri as an example, we see that Cruz ran 1,938 
ads, Trump ran 1,463 ads, Rubio ran 55, and Rand Paul ran 50 for a total of 3,506 run in Missouri.  
Therefore, Cruz’s ad percent is 55 percent, while Trump’s ad percent is 42 percent, and Rubio’s ad 
percent is just 2 percent.   
The data on campaign visits comes from my compilation of the data available from The National 
Journal’s candidate travel tracker, which I also verified through newspaper searches via LexisNexis.  I 
was able to compile a comprehensive list of all visits conducted throughout the entire length of the 
primary contest—including the invisible primary—broken down by state.  In some cases, some states 
received multiple visits in one day (e.g. a candidate visited both Buffalo, NY, and New York City, NY, on 
the same day).  In these cases, both visits were counted, as the candidate visited different locations, so 
they were likely speaking to different crowds.  For continuity, these are coded in the same way as ads 
and endorsements, using a percentage measurement.  By using a percentage rather than raw 
measurement, we are able to include data from all candidates that conducted visits and account for the 
relative differences between visits conducted by competitors.  For example, looking at the 37 total visits 
made by Democrats to California, we see that Clinton made 18 of those visits, compared to the 16 made 
by Sanders.  Clinton’s visit percentage is therefore 49 percent and Sander’s visit percentage is 43 
percent.   
Finally, the data for the individual-level variables come from the 2016 ANES Time Series Study.  
The gender and race variables are both dichotomous, with female and African American respondents 
coded 1 and their counterparts coded zero.  Age is coded as a continuous variable according to the age 
reported by the respondent.  The two issue variables used measure attitudes toward the economy and 
immigration.  The economy variable asks respondents what they think about the current state of the 
U.S. economy.  Responses range from very bad (coded 1) to very good (coded 5).  The immigration 
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variable asks respondents what U.S. immigration levels should be.  This is coded similarly to the 
economy variable on a one to five scale, ranging from immigration levels should be decreased a lot 
(coded one) to increased a lot (coded five).  For party identification and ideology, I use the reported 
seven-point scales ranging from strong Democrat and strong liberal to strong Republican and strong 
conservative, respectively.  
Lastly, I include control variables for a respondent’s religiosity and education level as well as a 
candidate’s home state.  Candidates tend to perform better in their home state and other candidates 
campaign less in an opponent’s home state because of the competitor’s favorite-son status.  I control for 
religiosity (in Republican models) because of the importance of religious, or evangelical, voters in 
Republican primaries.  Religiosity is coded on a one through five scale measuring regularity of church 
attendance, similarly to current research (Brewer 2003; Domke and Coe 2010; Fiorina et al2011; 
Kellstedt et al 2007; Wuthnow 1988).  The responses to this question range from one (the respondent 
attends a religious service at least weekly) to five (the respondent never attends a religious service).   
Finally, I control for education among Republican voters, as several news reports pointed to the fact that 
Trump seemed to be exciting this group of voters, with Trump going so far as to say “I love the poorly 
educated” (Kerr 2016).  Education is coded on a one to five scale, ranging from less than a high school 
degree (coded one) to advanced, or post-Bachelor’s, degree (coded five).   
In order to properly test this model, I have chosen to use a hierarchical linear model [HLM] with 
a random intercept because of the nested nature of the data of individuals within states.  Each voter 
brings with them predispositions—party identification, ideology, and preferences on issues.  Yet at the 
same time, these voters are also exposed to various campaign activities, such as advertisements and 
visits.  Voters are not making decisions in a vacuum; they are exposed to new information about the 
candidates running for office and often use this information when making a decision about which 
candidate to support (Jerit et al. 2006).  Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) demonstrate that even when the 
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information voters are exposed to contradicts the predisposed beliefs they already hold, in some cases 
these voters reassess their decision about which candidate to support.  Thus, these authors 
demonstrate that the context in which a voter resides (e.g. a state) can influence the individual-level 
predispositions a voter holds, exemplifying the need for incorporating both individual- and state-level 
predictors in our models of vote choice.  Thus, I argue that using an HLM to test these data is an 
appropriate modeling strategy.  Specifically, because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent 
variable I run a mixed-effects logistic regression with a random intercept.   
Results 
 The results for the Democratic candidates are presented in Table 1.  Among the state-level 
variables, campaign visits prove to be an asset to Bernie Sanders, while none of them seemed to 
motivate Clinton supporters to vote in her favor.  Sanders’ visits generated much excitement among 
voters, often drawing large and sometimes record-breaking crowds (for accounts of Sanders’ campaign 
rallies see Dillon 2016; Purcell and Barry 2016; Wagner 2016).  Clinton’s strategy involved holding 
smaller campaign events in which she could entertain questions and showcase her breadth of 
knowledge on policy issues, while Sanders opted for larger rallies showcasing the growing enthusiasm 
for his candidacy (Alba 2016; Zelany 2015).  In fact, one of Clinton’s largest rallies was her kickoff event 
in New York, which garnered about 5,000 people in attendance (Alba 2016).  In contrast to this, Sanders 
regularly attracted tens of thousands of people to his rallies.  For example, at a rally in Los Angeles, CA 
Sanders drew a crowd of 27,500 while also drawing a crowd of 28,000 in Portland, OR (O’Keefe and 
Wagner 2015).  The volume of people Sanders spoke to and the enthusiasm he developed at these 
rallies paid off in terms of votes.  For each additional visit conducted by Sanders, the odds of a voter 
supporting him increased by 3.7.   
[Table 1 about here] 
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 While visits were the only state-level variable that helped explain an individual’s vote choice for 
one of the Democratic candidates, several individual-level variables assist in explaining vote choice for 
Clinton and Sanders.  Age, race, gender, and issues all proved important for voters when they were 
choosing between Clinton and Sanders.  Older voter, females, and African American voters all supported 
Clinton over Sanders, while younger voters opted for Sanders.  Specifically, for each year older a voter 
was, the odds of he or she supporting Clinton increased by 1.04.  Sanders attracted younger voters at 
the same rate.  Sanders spoke often about making college more affordable, raising the minimum wage, 
and was quite popular with younger voters on social media.  This effort from Sanders to reach out to 
younger voters seems to have been effective, as they were more supportive of him than Clinton.  
Among female voters, the odds of supporting Clinton over Sanders increased by a factor of 1.65, likely 
because she was the first viable female candidate for a major party’s nomination.  African American 
voters were also more likely to support Clinton over Sanders by a factor of 2.94.  Clinton spent time on 
the campaign trail targeting African American voters, highlighting her past experience fighting 
discrimination and her more recent work for the Obama administration.   
 The issues of the economy and immigration also helped voters decide between Clinton and 
Sanders.  Voters who believed the economy had improved since the last election were more likely to 
support Clinton while those who believed the economy had not improved were more likely to support 
Sanders.  Specifically, the odds of supporting Clinton increased by 1.69 among those who believed the 
economy was improving, while the odds of supporting Sanders decreased by 0.59.  Because Clinton 
chose to strongly associate herself with Obama, she benefited from support from those who believed 
Obama had improved the U.S. economy, while Sanders received support from those who believed 
Obama had not done enough to improve the economic status of Americans.  Additionally, Sanders 
campaigned on multiple economic issues: increasing minimum wage to $15 per hour, increasing Wall 
Street regulations, and closing the wealth gap between the richest and poorest Americans.   
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The issue of immigration also helped increase the number of votes Sanders received.  Those that 
wanted to see immigration numbers increased were more likely to vote for Sanders by a factor of 1.13.  
Despite the fact that Clinton and Sanders had similar immigration stances, Sanders received more votes 
because of this issue.  This is likely due to the fact that immigration was largely framed as a compassion 
issue throughout this election cycle, with several Republicans calling for mass deportation and the 
building of a border wall and Democrats calling for compassion for those living in the United States 
illegally.  According to an AP poll, Sanders was viewed as the most compassionate candidate (cited in 
Holloway 2016), which is highlighted by his calls for increasing the number of Syrian refugees taken in by 
the U.S. (Gass 2015; PBS 2015).  This allowed Sanders to benefit from voters who cared about the issue 
of immigration.   
Turning now to Table 2, we see the results for the Republican candidates.  When we look at the 
various campaign activities, we can see that momentum helped Donald Trump, campaign visits helped 
Ted Cruz, and Marco Rubio benefited from home state advantage.  Trump, despite his overall 
unpopularity, continued to win nominating contests.  In fact, Trump won 41 contests out of a total of 56.  
His core group of supporters in each state showed up to vote and because he was able to keep winning 
contests, he developed a sense of momentum as the nominating season continued on.  While the 
substantial impact of this is practically negligible, he still received a slight bounce in support from voters.   
[Table 2 about here] 
Campaign visits proved to be an important predictor of vote choice for Cruz voters, but not 
Trump voters as was the expected outcome.  Despite the fact that Trump touted the size of the crowds 
at his rallies, these visits did not increase the odds of a voter supporting him over another Republican 
candidate.  Trump supporters were not motivated to vote for him because of the visits he conducted.  
The rallies Trump held attracted voters who were already convinced to support him.  Trump was well 
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known prior to running for the Republican nomination—not for his political prowess, but for his real 
estate experience.  Ted Cruz, in contrast, was less well known than Trump and over the course of the 
nominating season, he was labeled as the only real chance at stopping Trump from receiving the 
nomination (Glueck 2016).  Further, those that attended Cruz events were not just Cruz supporters, but 
those that were “on-the-fence” (Zezima 2016).  So, while Cruz was not receiving as much headline 
attention as Trump via rallies and other campaign visits, the fact that his rallies were well attended and 
also attracted voters who were “on-the-fence” about who to vote for, demonstrates the ability visits 
have to sway voters in the voting booth.   
Marco Rubio benefited from home state advantage in Florida.  In fact, the odds of supporting 
Rubio increased by 4.31 in Florida.  Nonetheless, Rubio was unable to turn this home state advantage 
into a win.  Why was Trump able to win Rubio’s home state?  Likely because of the demographics of 
Florida’s primary voters.  As will be discussed further below, Trump won support from voters with lower 
levels of education.  Looking at the exit polls out of Florida, reported by CNN (2016), we can see that 47 
percent of those who turned out to vote had less than a college education and 51 percent of these 
voters supported Trump.  In addition, 85 percent of those who voted in Florida were dissatisfied with 
the federal government and Trump won 49 percent of these voters (CNN 2016).  So even though Rubio 
received a bump due to his favored-son status, he nonetheless lost the primary because he was part of 
the federal government the Floridian citizenry was overwhelmingly upset with.   
Looking now at the individual-level predictors of vote choice, we see that there are several 
predictors that help explain who voters chose in the voting booth.  Trump and Cruz both benefited from 
religiosity, though from different ends of the spectrum.  Trump benefited from those who did not 
identify as religious, while Cruz benefited from those who did.  Those who ranked higher on the 
religiosity scale (i.e. those who did not often attend a religious service) were more likely to vote for 
Trump by a factor of 1.33.  Those that ranked lower on the religiosity scale (i.e. those who did regularly 
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attend a religious service) were more likely to support Cruz.  Considering Cruz’s messaging and support 
of the religious right, it is unsurprising to see Cruz benefit from the more religious voters.  In addition, 
Trump’s religious attachment was murky at best so it makes sense that he received support from voters 
who were less religious.  In a related vein, Cruz also won support of the more conservative voters.  
Those that identified as more conservative were more likely to support Cruz over his rivals by a factor of 
1.84.  This can also be explained by Cruz’s support of the religious right and his conservative messaging. 
Trump also benefited from voters who did not have high levels of education.  In fact, the more 
education a voter had, the odds of him or her voting for Trump decreased by 0.78.  On the campaign 
trail, Trump regularly attacked the higher education system and the politically correct nature of 
American politics, much of which many conservatives blame on the higher education system.  Many 
voters also appreciated Trump’s ability to be plain spoken and “tell it like it is.”  All of this demonstrates 
why lower levels of education were a strong predictor of Trump’s support.   
Rubio and Trump were also buoyed by voters that viewed immigration as important; and 
similarly to the religiosity variable, these two candidates received support from voters at the opposite 
ends of the spectrum.  Trump received support from voters who wanted to see the number of 
immigrants in America decreased while Rubio received support from those who wanted to see this 
number increase.  Immigration was a major part of Trump’s campaign rhetoric, with him regularly calling 
for a wall to be built at the Mexican-American border and undocumented immigrants to be deported.  
Rubio, on the other hand was less hard-lined on the issue.  He was an initial sponsor of the “Gang of 
Eight” bill which would have granted provisional citizenship status to many undocumented immigrants.  
While this legislation did not pass, Rubio took further stances that supported an increase in the number 
of H-1B visas to increase the number of skilled immigrants allowed into the United States.  Thus 
Republicans on both sides of the immigration debate had a candidate to turn to in the nomination 
contests.   
21 
 
Rubio also received support from female voters.  In fact, among female voters, the odds of 
supporting Rubio increased by 2.13.  Given the fact that Trump’s support from women was never high, 
Cruz continually struggled with female voters (in fact, according to Glueck 2016, Cruz’s favorability 
polling among female voters was lower than Trump’s), and John Kasich was seen as a long shot by many 
Republican voters regardless of gender, Rubio was likely the only viable Republican candidate left for 
female Republicans to support.   
 Now, if we look at Tables 3 and 4, which present the results without controlling for the 
individual-level predictors, we see that we get a completely different story for both the Democratic and 
Republican contests.  To obtain these results, I ran logistic regressions with only state-level predictors 
and clustered the standard errors by state to account for the multiple observations within each state.   
[Table 3 about here] 
The results in Table 3 present the results for the Democratic contests.  These results 
demonstrate that visits are no longer a significant predictor of vote choice for Sanders, but home state 
is.  For Clinton, her advertisements are shown to increase the odds of voters supporting her.  While 
these are not necessarily problematic results per se, they are problematic in the sense that without 
controlling for the individual-level predictors, we are not given the full picture of how voters make 
decisions.   
[Table 4 about here] 
Similarly for the Republican candidates, the results for which are presented in Table 4, we can 
see that we are given a different explanation for an individual’s vote choice when removing the 
individual-level controls.  While momentum still attains significance for Trump and Rubio still maintains 
his home state advantage, the visits variable is no longer predictive of support for Cruz, as demonstrated 
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in the full model.  Again, these are not problematic results on their own, they simply do not give us the 
full explanation for how voters made a decision in 2016.   
Conclusions 
 In 2016, both the Republican and Democratic nominating contests appear to have been decided 
by a combination of campaign activities and individual-level traits and predispositions.  Endorsements 
and advertisements did not attain significance in any of the models, while visits and momentum 
mattered for some candidates, but not all.  Among the Democratic candidates, Clinton received an 
overwhelming number of elite endorsements, but they did not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance.  The 2016 nominating season included much pushback against the party establishment.  
This is one of the reasons Bernie Sanders was able to pose such a strong challenge to Hillary Clinton, 
who was the overwhelming favorite throughout the invisible primary period.  Further, neither Clinton 
nor Sanders was able to achieve any sort of momentum throughout the nomination season.  This is 
likely due to the fact that the Democratic race ultimately came down to only two candidates, which 
makes it harder for one of these candidates to develop momentum.  Aldrich (1980) tells us that in a two 
candidate race, it is more difficult for one candidate to develop momentum because as the two 
candidates volley wins back and forth, their resources will also ebb and flow with those wins—provided 
both candidates are considered competitive, which was the case in 2016.   
On the Republican side, we saw the elites mostly in agreement that Trump should not be the 
party’s nominee; however, the elites could not pick a candidate to rally behind and instead split their 
endorsements between Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, and John Kasich.  Specifically, Trump received no 
endorsements until February 24, 2017, well after primary voting began on February 1, 2017.  Further, he 
amassed only  15 out of 204 total endorsements, while Marco Rubio received the most among the 
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Republican candidates with 62 (Bycoffe 2017).  This, coupled with the antiestablishment nature of the 
2016 nominating contests helps explain why elite endorsements did not matter in this nomination cycle.   
In terms of advertisements, on the Democratic side, Clinton and Sanders ran comparable 
numbers of ads, with Clinton running only slightly more.  Among the Republican candidates, there was 
again, not much difference in the number of overall ads run by the candidates.  None of these three 
candidates, at least, was completely out-advertised by his competitors.  In addition, there is a possibility 
that television advertising is losing effectiveness.  With the increased availability of online streaming of 
television shows and movies, fewer Americans are exposed to commercials.  In addition, the number of 
Americans with DVR devices is increasing, allowing television viewers the ability to fast forward through 
ads.  In fact, according to a report from the Leichtman Research Group, 81 percent of Americans have a 
DVR, a Netflix subscription, or a subscription to an on-demand service—all of which allows them the 
opportunity to bypass paid advertising (Frankel 2016).    
 In addition, the importance of using an HLM—or at least controlling for both individual- and 
state-level predictors—has been established.  Without looking at both levels of predictors, we would not 
know whether the campaign activities candidates took part in were truly having an impact, or if votes 
mainly resulted from individual predispositions.  Using a hierarchical linear model to test for campaign 
effects allows us to see that in 2016, individual- and state-level variables were important to voters as 
they decided which candidate to support, thus bolstered the idea that campaigns do indeed matter.   
 Further, I have demonstrated the importance of separating out the effects of visits and ads.  
Visits proved effective for Cruz and Sanders, while ads did not help any candidate gain votes.  Visits 
deserve a more thorough treatment from elections scholars seeking to understand how voters make 
decisions in the voting booth.  These visits are an important aspect of a voter’s decision making process 
and need to be further studied.  One future avenue for a richer understanding of the effects of visits 
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would be to look at the interaction between visits and media coverage.  Not all voters will attend a visit, 
but they may learn about the visit—or more importantly, the candidate—through local news coverage.  
Local newspapers and television news crews will likely cover a campaign rally or town hall meeting and 
thus spread a candidate’s message to those who did not attend the campaign event.  So despite the fact 
that visits did prove effective for Sanders and Cruz, their effects are potentially even greater than 
reported here.   
 Overall, what has been demonstrated here is that individual-level predictors of vote choice 
along with campaign activities are important for voters.  If we are to truly understand how voters make 
a decision, we need to include variables from both levels and an HLM allows us to do just that.  Further, 
campaign visits are an important—if understudied—campaign activity that require further attention if 
we want to better understand a voter’s decision-making process.   
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Table 1: Predictors of Vote Choice in 2016 Democratic Nominating Contests 
 Clinton Sanders 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Endorsements 0.591 
(0.407) 
 -0.612 
(1.142) 
 
Momentum 0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.000 
(0.001) 
 
Visits 0.413 
(0.677) 
 1.307* 
(0.629) 
3.70 
Advertisements 0.780 
(0.511) 
 0.562 
(0.528) 
 
Home State -0.032 
(0.327) 
 1.543 
1.299 
 
Age 0.044** 
(0.006) 
1.04 -0.044** 
(0.006) 
0.96 
Gender 0.500** 
(0.183) 
1.65 -0.496 
(0.183) 
 
Race 1.077** 
(0.294) 
2.94 -1.030 
(0.297) 
 
Party ID -0.015 
(0.038) 
 0.014 
(0.038) 
 
Ideology 0.071 
(0.080) 
 -0.076 
(0.079) 
 
Economy 0.523** 
(0.108) 
1.69 -0.522* 
(0.108) 
0.59 
Immigration -0.108 
(0.098) 
 0.119** 
(0.098) 
1.13 
Constant -5.086** 
(0.805) 
 3.091** 
(0.700) 
 
Variance 
Components: 
    
Intercept 0.208 
(0.210) 
 0.135 
(0.306) 
 
Intra-Class 
Correlation 
0.013  0.005  
N 
(Individual/State) 
651/46  651/46  
*denotes p<0.05; **denotes p<0.01 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; Odds ratios provided for variables that attain statistical 
significance.   
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Table 2: Predictors of Vote Choice in 2016 Republican Nominating Contests 
 Trump Cruz Rubio 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Endorsements 0.249 
(0.911) 
 0.439 
(0.584) 
 -0.219 
(0.592) 
 
Momentum 0.001* 
(0.000) 
1.00 -0.000 
(0.001) 
 -0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Visits -2.207 
(1.449) 
 3.804* 
(1.893) 
44.88 3.187 
(2.186) 
 
Advertisements -0.082 
(0.451) 
 0.456 
(0.566) 
 0.847 
(0.971) 
 
Home State 0.317 
(0.710) 
 0.093 
(0.659) 
 1.462* 
(0.603) 
4.31 
Age 0.004 
(0.005) 
 -0.014 
(0.008) 
 0.007 
(0.010) 
 
Gender -0.371 
(0.201) 
 -0.071 
(0.242) 
 0.757* 
(0.321) 
2.13 
Race ------- 
(-------) 
 ------- 
(-------) 
 ------- 
(-------) 
 
Party ID 0.028 
(0.042) 
 -0.021 
(0.049) 
 0.034 
(0.070) 
 
Ideology -0.109 
(0.105) 
 0.612** 
(0.153) 
1.84 0.053 
(0.162) 
 
Religiosity 0.288** 
(0.089) 
1.33 -0.294** 
(0.113) 
0.75 -0.032 
(0.140) 
 
Economy -0.054 
(0.122) 
 -0.213 
(0.150) 
 -0.053 
(0.186) 
 
Education -0.247* 
(0.103) 
0.78 0.010 
(0.126) 
 0.064 
(0.160) 
 
Immigration -0.589** 
(0.107) 
0.55 -0.048 
(0.124) 
 0.457** 
(0.151) 
1.58 
Constant 2.046* 
(1.025) 
 -3.382* 
(1.384) 
 -4.907** 
(1.624) 
 
Variance 
Components: 
      
Intercept 0.000 
(0.081) 
 0.001 
(0.015) 
 0.209 
(0.428) 
 
Intra-Class 
Correlation 
0.000000001  0.0000004  0.013  
N 
(Individual/State) 
486/46  486/46  486/46  
*denotes p<0.05; **denotes p<0.01 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses; Race dropped for all three models because it predicted failure 
perfectly; Odds ratios provided for variables that attain statistical significance.   
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Table 3: Logistic Regression of State-Level Predictors Only for 2016 Democrats 
 
 Clinton Sanders 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Endorsements 0.155 
(0.257) 
 -0.495 
(0.820) 
 
Momentum 0.000 
(0.001) 
 -0.000 
(0.001) 
 
Visits 0.632 
(0.639) 
 1.067 
(0.560) 
 
Advertisements 0.764* 
(0.380) 
2.15 0.530 
(0.429) 
 
Home State -0.020 
(0.383) 
 1.595** 
(0.419) 
4.93 
Constant -0.427 
(0.307) 
 -1.092** 
(0.185) 
 
N 971  971  
*denotes p<0.05; **denotes p<0.01 
Note: Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses; Odds ratios provided for variables that attain 
statistical significance.  
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Table 4: Logistic Regression of State-Level Predictors Only for 2016 Republicans 
 
 Trump Cruz Rubio 
 Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Endorsements 0.480 
(0.659) 
 0.534 
(0.365) 
 -0.569 
(0.545) 
 
Momentum 0.001** 
(0.000) 
1.00 -0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Visits -0.188 
(0.940) 
 1.628 
(1.313) 
 2.247 
(1.570) 
 
Advertisements -0.093 
(0.297) 
 0.600 
(0.492) 
 1.853** 
(0.693) 
6.38 
Home State 0.308 
(0.229) 
 -0.090 
(0.340) 
 1.990** 
(0.236) 
7.32 
Constant -0.026 
(0.145) 
 -1.845** 
(0.213) 
 -2.674** 
(0.326) 
 
N 859  859  859  
 *denotes p<0.05; **denotes p<0.01 
Note: Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses; Odds ratios provided for variables that attain 
statistical significance.   
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State Clinton Sanders Trump Rubio Cruz Clinton Sanders Trump Rubio Cruz Clinton Sanders Trump Rubio Cruz
Alabama 1 0 1 0 1 3 1 3 3 3 1699 0 758 71 374
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 799 0 0 114
Arizona 2 1 0 2 4 1 5 3 0 2 1627 3674 832 0 0
Arkansas 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 3 3 2 941 0 580 441 881
California 39 0 1 3 2 18 16 8 7 6 10777 11643 380 350 167
Colorado 5 0 0 2 3 2 4 1 2 2 2604 4275 0 0 0
Connecticut 8 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 0 4638 4486 0 0 0
Delaware 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1176 2036 347 0 206
Washington, D.C. 0 0 0 0 0 10 2 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Florida 9 1 2 7 0 6 1 11 2 6 3941 972 2891 0 0
Georgia 2 0 0 3 1 3 3 4 7 6 741 0 1963 1583 3287
Hawaii 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 293 733 0 528 0
Idaho 0 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 3 1 0 1345 0 1088 817
Illinois 9 0 0 3 0 4 8 3 5 1 13577 13303 2448 1195 3400
Indiana 2 0 0 3 1 3 2 3 0 3 4135 6257 2926 0 4436
Iowa 1 0 0 0 1 21 17 22 15 20 23001 21139 6336 8311 4570
Kansas 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 0 1 2 2079 2316 170 137 1370
Kentucky 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 1 1 1 2946 2320 493 0 1573
Louisiana 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 757 0 0 0 713
Maine 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 4504 1676 929 125 225
Maryland 9 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 1 2 1305 1521 0 0 0
Massachusetts 10 0 0 0 0 6 4 4 2 2 13819 9026 1120 1355 106
Michigan 7 0 0 3 1 7 5 4 3 5 6980 9976 2046 0 1057
Minnesota 4 3 0 2 0 5 6 0 2 1 4528 7706 900 621 623
Mississippi 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 885 152 133 104 72
Missouri 4 0 0 1 2 3 4 2 1 2 13149 5221 1463 55 1938
Montana 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 159 0 0 0
Nebraska 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 4198 4895 2061 3150 1535
Nevada 2 0 0 0 0 9 7 6 7 7 7097 7781 745 738 182
New Hampshire 3 0 0 0 0 18 21 24 18 13 12510 10963 2544 3367 443
New Jersey 7 0 1 0 0 4 1 2 1 0 2939 4226 347 0 206
New Mexico 4 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 660 230 240 0 0
New York 21 0 2 1 0 6 9 10 12 7 9800 12986 1335 722 124
North Carolina 3 0 1 2 1 1 3 5 2 4 6292 3903 2148 4440 0
North Dakota 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 683 0 0 0
Ohio 3 1 0 0 0 6 4 6 4 3 7895 5431 3047 0 994
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 2299 4400 156 459 1279
Oregon 5 1 0 0 0 1 4 1 0 0 0 692 0 0 0
Pennsylvania 7 0 3 2 0 7 6 4 1 1 6126 8300 1382 0 1041
Rhode Island 5 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1005 2933 0 0 0
South Carolina 1 0 0 4 4 8 8 20 18 17 5164 4509 3675 7298 5945
South Dakota 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2881 1277 15 1189
Tennessee 2 0 2 3 0 2 0 3 4 3 1850 0 973 575 1284
Texas 10 0 0 0 11 5 4 4 8 1 3522 1402 864 0 1322
Utah 0 0 0 5 3 1 1 1 2 1 0 1987 255 0 324
Vermont 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 6776 4283 1615 1887 0
Virginia 6 0 0 2 0 4 5 7 1 2 2927 0 884 924 69
Washington 9 0 0 1 0 1 3 1 1 2 0 2346 0 0 153
West Virginia 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 997 549 59 0 0
Wisconsin 3 0 0 2 3 3 4 4 1 7 14830 12755 1359 0 2426
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 706 0 0 0
Total 220 9 15 62 44 188 182 192 145 147 216989 209576 51681 39539 44445
Endorsements Received Visits Conducted Advertisements Run
Appendix: Raw Numbers of Endorsements, Visits, and Advertisements for Candidates Analyzed 
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